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Abstract
Neural network image classifiers are known to be vulnerable to adversarial images,
i.e., natural images which have been modified by an adversarial perturbation specif-
ically designed to be imperceptible to humans yet fool the classifier. Not only can
adversarial images be generated easily, but these images will often be adversarial
for networks trained on disjoint subsets of data or with different architectures.
Adversarial images represent a potential security risk as well as a serious machine
learning challenge—it is clear that vulnerable neural networks perceive images
very differently from humans. Noting that virtually every image classification data
set is composed of JPG images, we evaluate the effect of JPG compression on the
classification of adversarial images. For Fast-Gradient-Sign perturbations of small
magnitude, we found that JPG compression often reverses the drop in classification
accuracy to a large extent, but not always. As the magnitude of the perturbations
increases, JPG recompression alone is insufficient to reverse the effect.
1 Introduction
Neural networks are now widely used across machine learning, including image classification, where
they achieve state-of-the-art accuracy on standard benchmarks [Rus+15; He+15]. However, neural
networks have recently been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial examples [Sze+13], i.e., inputs
to the network that have undergone imperceptible perturbations specifically optimized to cause the
neural network to strongly misclassify.
Most neural networks trained for image classification are trained on images that have undergone
JPG compression. Adversarial perturbations are unlikely to leave an image in the space of JPG
images, and so this paper explores the idea that JPG (re)compression could remove some aspects of
the adversarial perturbation. Our experiments show that JPG compression often succeeds in reversing
the adversarial nature of images that have been modified by a small-magnitude perturbation produced
by the Fast Gradient Sign method of Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy [GSS14]. However, as the
magnitude of the perturbation increases, JPG compression is unable to recover a non-adversarial
image and therefore JPG compression cannot, by itself, guard against the security risk of adversarial
examples.
We begin by discussing related work and in particular a recent preprint by Kurakin, Goodfellow,
and Bengio [KGB16] showing independent work that the effect of certain varieties of adversarial
perturbations can even survive being printed on paper and recaptured by a digital camera. This same
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preprint also reports on the effect of JPG compression quality on adversarial perturbations. Our
experiments are complimentary, as we vary the magnitude of the perturbation.
2 Related Work
Szegedy et al. [Sze+13] were the first to demonstrate adversarial examples: working within the context
of image classification, they found the smallest additive perturbation η to an image x that caused the
network to misclassify the image x+ η. In their paper introducing the concept, they demonstrated
the surprising phenomenon that adversarial examples generalized across neural networks trained
on disjoint subsets of training data, as well as across neural networks with different architectures
and initializations. Papernot et al. [Pap+16] exploited this property to demonstrate how one could
construct adversarial examples for a network of an unknown architecture by training an auxiliary
neural network on related data.
These findings highlight that adversarial examples pose a potential security risk in real-world applica-
tions of neural networks such as autonomous car navigation and medical image analysis. Adversarial
examples also pose a challenge for machine learning, because they expose an apparently large gap
between the inductive bias of humans and machines. In part due to both challenges, there has been a
flood of work following the original demonstration of adversarial examples that attempts to explain
the phenomenon and protect systems.
Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy [GSS14] argued that neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial
perturbations due to the linear nature of neural networks and presented some experimental evidence
that neural network classifiers with non-linear activations are more robust. Tabacof and Valle [TV15]
demonstrated empirically that adversarial examples are not isolated points and the neural networks are
more robust to random noise than adversarial noise. Billovits, Eric, and Agarwala [BEA16] visualized
how adversarial perturbations change activations in a convolutional neural network. They also ran
a number of experiments to better understand which images are more susceptible to adversarial
perturbations depending on the magnitude of the classifier’s prediction on clean versions of the image.
Several authors have proposed solutions to adversarial examples with mixed success [Pap+15; GR14].
Gu and Rigazio [GR14] proposed the use of an autoencoder (AE) to remove adversarial perturbations
from inputs. While the AE could effectively remove adversarial noise, the combination of the AE
and the neural network was even less robust to adversarial perturbations. They proposed to use a
contractive AE instead, which increased the size of the perturbation needed to alter the classifier’s
predicted class.
While most of the work has been empirical, Fawzi, Fawzi, and Frossard [FFF15] gave a theoretical
analysis of robustness to adversarial examples and random perturbations for binary linear and
quadratic classifiers. They compute upper bounds on the robustness of linear and quadratic classifiers.
The upper bounds suggests that quadratic classifiers are more robust to adversarial perturbations than
linear ones.
A recent paper by Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio [KGB16] makes several significant contributions
to the understanding of adversarial images. In addition to introducing several new methods for
producing large adversarial perturbations that remain imperceptible, they demonstrate the existence
of adversarial examples “in the physical world”. To do so, Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio compute
adversarial images for the Inception classifier [Sze+15], print these adversarial images onto paper,
and then recapture the images using a cell-phone camera. They demonstrate that, even after this
process of printing and recapturing, a large fraction of the images remain adversarial. The authors
also experimented with multiple transformations of adversarial images: changing brightness and
contrast, adding Gaussian blur, and varying JPG compression quality. This last aspect of their work
relates to the experiments we report here.
3 Hypothesis
What is the nature of adversarial examples? Why do they exist? And why are they robust to changes
in training data, network architecture, etc?
Adversarial perturbations are considered interesting because they are judged to be imperceptible
by humans, yet they are (by definition) extremely perceptible to neural network classifiers, even
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Figure 1: The red dots represent the data and the grey line the data subspace. The solid blue arrow is
the adversarial perturbation that moves the data point x away from the data subspace and the dotted
blue arrow is the projection on the subspace. In the case where the perturbation is approximately
orthogonal to the JPG subspace, JPG compression brings the adversarial example back to the data
subspace.
across a wide variety of training regimes. A basic hypothesis underlying this work is that, in any
challenging high-dimensional classification task where the inputs naturally live in (or near) a complex
lower-dimensional data subspace, adversarial examples will lie outside this data subspace, taking
advantage of the fact that the training objective for the neural network is essentially agnostic to the
network’s behavior outside the data subspace.
Even if individual neural network classifiers were not robust to imperceptible perturbations, we might
settle for a measure of confidence/credibility reporting high uncertainty on adversarial examples. In
theory, we would expect confidence intervals or credible sets associated with neural network classifiers
to represent high uncertainty on adversarial images provided that, outside the data subspace, there was
disagreement among the family of classifiers achieving, e.g., high likelihood/posterior probability. In
practice, efficient computational methods may not be able to determine whether there is uncertainty.
The field has poor understanding of both issues. To date, no frequentist or Bayesian approach has
demonstrated the ability to correctly classify or report high uncertainty on adversarial images.
At the very least, adversarial examples reflect the fact that neural network classifiers are relying on
properties of the data different from those used by humans. In theory, even a classifier trained on a
data set of diverging size might fall prey to adversarial examples if the training data live on a subspace.
Techniques such as data augmentation (e.g., by adding noise or adversarial perturbations) would be
expected to remove a certain class of adversarial examples, but unless the notion of “perceptible
perturbation” is exactly captured by the data augmentation scheme, it seems that there will always be
space for adversarial examples to exist.1
Natural image classification is an example of a high-dimensional classification task whose inputs
have low intrinsic dimension. Indeed, we can be all but certain that if we were to randomly generate
a bitmap, the result would not be a natural image. On the other hand, humans are not affected by
adversarial perturbations or other perturbations such as random noise, and so we introduce the notion
of the perceptual subspace: the space of bitmaps perceived by humans as being natural images
with some corruption. Empirical evidence suggests that neural networks learn to make accurate
predictions inside the data subspace. Neural networks are also understood to be fairly resistant
to random perturbations as these perturbations are understood to cancel themselves out [GSS14].
Neural networks classifiers work well, in part, due to their strong inductive biases. But this same bias
means that a neural network may report strong predictions beyond the data subspace where there is
1The extent to which humans are themselves susceptible to adversarial imagery is not well understood, at
least by the machine learning community. Can small perturbations (e.g., in the mean-squared-error) cause human
perception to change dramatically?
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no training data. We cannot expect sensible predictions outside the data subspace from individual
classifiers.2
If we could project adversarial images back onto the data subspace, we could conceivable get rid
of adversarial perturbations. Unfortunately, it is not clear whether it is possible to characterize
or learn a suitable representation of the data subspace corresponding to natural images. We may,
however, be able to find other lower-dimensional subspaces that contain the data subspace. To
that end, note that most image classification data sets, like ImageNet [Rus+15], are built from JPG
images. Call this set of images the JPG subspace, which necessarily contains the data subspace.
Perturbations of natural images (by adding scaled white noise or randomly corrupting a small number
of pixels) are almost certain to move an image out of the JPG subspace and therefore out of the data
subspace. While we cannot project on the data subspace, we can use JPG compression to “project”
the perturbed images back onto the JPG subspace. We might expect JPG compression to reverse
adversarial perturbations for several reasons: First, adversarial perturbations could be very sensitive
and reversed by most image processing steps. (Our findings contradict this, as do the findings in
[KGB16].) Second, adversarial perturbations might be “orthogonal” to the JPG subspace, in which
case we would expect the modifications to be removed by JPG compression. (Our findings for
small perturbations do not contradict this idea, though larger perturbations are not removed by JPG
compression. It would be interesting to evaluate the discrete cosine transformation of adversarial
images to settle this hypothesis.) More study is necessary to explain our findings.
4 Empirical findings
We evaluated the effect of adversarial perturbations on the network’s classification, and then studied
how the classification was affected by a further JPG compression of the adversarial image. We
measured the change at several different magnitudes of adversarial perturbation.
We used the pre-trained OverFeat network (Sermanet et al., 2013), which was trained on images
from the 2012 ImageNet training set (1000 classes). The training images used to produce OverFeat
underwent several preprocessing steps: they were scaled so that the smallest dimension was 256; then
5 random crops of size 221× 221 were produced; finally, the set of images (viewed as vectors) were
then standardized to have zero mean and unit variance. (When we refer to standardization below, we
are referring to the process of repeating precisely the same shift and scaling used to standardize the
training data fed to OverFeat.) The OverFeat network is composed of ReLU activations and max
pooling operations, 5 convolutional layers, and 3 fully connected layers.
For a (bitmap) image x, we will write JPG(x) to denote the JPG compression of x at quality level 75.
For a network with weights w and input image x, let pw(c|x) be the probability assigned to class c.
Let `x = arg max pw(c|x) be the class label assigned the highest probability (which we will assume
is unique). Then pw(`x|x) is the probability assigned to this label.
To generate adversarial examples, we used the Fast Gradient Sign method introduced by Goodfellow,
Shlens, and Szegedy [GSS14]. Let w represent the pre-trained weights of the OverFeat network. The
Fast Gradient Sign perturbation is calculated by scaling the element-wise sign of the gradient of the
training objective J(x,w, y) with respect to the image x for the label y = `x, i.e.,
η(x) =

255
sign
(∇x′J(x′, w, y) |x′=x,y=`x)
and thus
Adv(x) = x+ η(x) (1)
The image gradient ∇x′J(x′, w, y) can be efficiently computed using back propagation. In our
experiments with the OverFeat network, we used  ∈ {1, 5, 10}. See Fig. 2 for several examples of
images after adversarial perturbations of increasing magnitudes.
2 One would hope that, even if individual neural networks achieving high posterior probability suffered from
adversarial perturbations, networks sampled from a Bayesian posterior would disagree on the classification of
an input outside the data subspace, representing uncertainty. However, our experiments with current scalable
approximate Bayesian neural network methods (namely, variants of stochastic gradient Langevin dynamics
[WT11; Li+15]) revealed that Bayesian neural networks report confident misclassifications on adversarial
examples. It is worth evaluating other approximate inference frameworks.
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Figure 2: (first) Original image x, with label “agama” assigned 0.99 probability; (second) Adversarial
image Adv(x), where  = 1, with label “rock crab” assigned 0.93 probability and label “agama”
assigned 6× 10−5 probability; (third and fourth) Adversarial images Adv(x) with  set to 5 and 10.
Both assign probability ≈ 0 to “agama”. However, adversarial noise becomes apparent; (last) JPG
compression of the adversarial image, JPG(Adv(x)) with  = 1, with label “agama” assigned 0.96
probability.
For each image x in the ImageNet validation set, we performed the following steps:
1. Scale x so that its smallest dimension is 256; crop to the centered 221× 221 square region;
and then standardize;
2. Compute Adv(x) using the Fast Gradient Sign method, with  ∈ {1, 5, 10};
3. Compute JPG(Adv(x)) using the save method from Torch7’s image package;
4. Compute the OverFeat network predictions for all images: original x, adversarial Adv(x);
and compressed JPG(Adv(x)).
For an image x, we will refer to pw(`x|x) as its top-label probability and, more generally, for a
transformation f acting on images, we will refer to pw(`x|f(x)) as the top-label probability after
transformation f .
Fig. 3 gives a coarse summary of how JPG compression affects adversarial examples, while Fig. 4
gives a more detailed picture at the level of individual images for the case of perturbations of
magnitude  = 1. We will now explain these figures in turn.
Fig. 3 reports statistics on the top-label probability under various transformations for every image in
the validation set . The first boxplot summarizes the distribution of the top-label probability for the
validation images when no perturbations have been made. As we see, the network assigns, on average,
0.6 probability to the most probable label and the interquartile range lies away from the extremes
0 and 1. While we might consider JPG (re)compression to be a relatively innocuous operation, the
second boxplot reveals that JPG compression already affects the top-label probability negatively. The
third boxplot summarizes the top-label probability under an adversarial transformation of magnitude
1/255: the mean probability assigned to the top label `x drops from approximately 0.6 to below
0.15. The top-label probability after JPG compression of the adversarial images increases back
towards the levels of JPG compressed images, but falls short: the mean recovers to just over 0.4.
Larger adversarial perturbations (of magnitude 5/255 and 10/255) cause more dramatic negative
changes to the top-label probability. Moreover, JPG compression of these more perturbed images
is not effective at reversing the adversarial perturbation: the top-label probability remains almost
unchanged, improving only slightly.
The scatter plots in Fig. 4 paint a more detailed picture for small advesarial perturbations ( = 1).
In every scatter plot, a point (p1, p2) specifies the top-label probability under a pair (f1, f2) of
transformations, respectively. In the first plot, we see the effect of JPG compression on the top-label
probability, which can be combined with the second boxplot in Fig. 3 to better understand the
effect of JPG compression on a neural networks top-label probability assignments. In short, JPG
compression can lower and raise the top-label probability, although the mean effect is negative, and
JPG compression affects images with high top-label probabilities least. The bottom-left plot shows
the strong negative effect of the adversarial perturbation on the top-label probability, which can be
contrasted with the top-middle plot, where we see that the top-label probabilities recover almost to
the level of the original images after JPG recompression. (C.f., boxplots 2 and 4 in Fig. 3.)
If JPG compression were a good surrogate for projection onto the data subspace, we would expect
the top-label probabilities to recover to the level of the top-label probabilities for JPG(x). This is
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Figure 3: The top-label probabilities, i.e., the predicted probability (y-axis) assigned to the most
likely class `x, after various transformations x 7→ f(x). The red horizontal line in each box plots is
the average top-label probability. The solid red line is the median, the box represents the interquartile
range, and the whiskers represent the minimum and maximum values, excluding outliers. Labels
along the bottom specify the transformation f(x) applied to the image x before measuring the
top-label probability.
not quite the case, even for small perturbations ( = 1), although the adversarial nature of these
images is often significantly reduced. For larger perturbations, the effect of JPG compression is small.
(This agrees with the finding by Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio [KGB16] that Fast Gradient Sign
perturbations are quite resilient to image transformations, including JPG compression.)
Does the improvement for small perturbations yielded by JPG compression depend on the specific
structure of JPG compression or could it be mimicked with noise sharing some similar statistics?
To test this hypothesis, we studied the effect on top-label probabilities after adding a random
permutation of the vector representing the effect of JPG compression. More precisely, let P be a
random permutation matrix. We tested the effect of the perturbation
ηJPG(x) = P∆(Adv(x)), where ∆(x′) = JPG(x′)− x′, (2)
which we call JPG noise. Thus, we studied the top-label probabilities for images of the form
JPGnoise(Adv(x)) = Adv(x) + ηJPG(x). (3)
By construction, JPG noise shares every permutation-invariant statistics with JPG compression, but
loses, e.g., information about the direction of the JPG compression modification. The last box plot in
Fig. 3 shows that adversarial images remain adversarial after adding JPG noise: indeed, the average
predicted probability for `x is even lower than for adversarial images (second box plot).
Table 1 summarizes classification accuracy and mean top-label probabilities after various transforma-
tions applied to images in the ImageNet validation set. (C.f., Fig. 3.) Notice that the accuracy drops
dramatically after adversarial perturbation. JPG compression increases the accuracy substantially
for small perturbations ( = 1), however, the accuracy is still lower than on clean images. For larger
adversarial perturbations ( ∈ {5, 10}), JPG compression does not increase accuracy enough to
represent a practical solution to adversarial examples.
5 Conclusion
Our experiments demonstrate that JPG compression can reverse small adversarial perturbations
created by the Fast-Gradient-Sign method. However, if the adversarial perturbations are larger, JPG
compression does not reverse the adversarial perturbation. In this case, the strong inductive bias
of neural network classifiers leads to incorrect yet confident misclassifications. Even the largest
perturbations that we evaluated are barely visible to an untrained human eye, and so JPG compression
is far from a solution. We do not yet understand why JPG compression reverses small adversarial
perturbations.
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Figure 4: In every scatter plot, every validation image x is represented by a point (p1, p2), which
specifies the top-label probabilities pj = pw(`x|fj(x)) under a pair (f1, f2) of modifications of the
image, respectively. All adversarial perturbations in these figures were generated with magnitude
 = 1. Along the top row, the x-axis represents the top-label probability for a clean image. (top left)
The plot illustrates the effect of JPG compression of a natural image. The predictions do change, but
on average they lie close to the diagonal and do not change the top-label probability appreciably; (top
middle) If JPG compression of the adversarial image removed adversarial perturbations, we would
expect this plot to look like the one to the left. While they are similar (most points lie around the
diagonal), more images lie in the lower right triangle, suggesting that the adversarial perturbations
are sometimes not removed or only partially removed. (top right) Adding JPG noise does not reverse
the effect of adversarial perturbations: indeed, points lie closer to the lower axis than under a simple
adversarial modification; (bottom left) The top-label probabilities after adversarial perturbation drops
substantially on average; (bottom right) This plot complements the top-middle plot. Most of the
points lie on the upper left triangle, which suggests that JPG compression of an adversarial image
increases the top-label probability and partially reverses the effect of many adversarial perturbations.
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